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ABSTRACT 
The Social Security Act 1964 provides for discretion in the recovery of 
debts due to the Crown. The discretion is vested in the Chief Executive of the 
Ministry of Social Development. This paper investigates the administrative law 
backdrop of the Chief Executive's discretion and proposes a range of 
considerations that should be taken into account whenever the discretion is 
employed. In order to place the discretion into context, this paper analyses the 
factors the Chief Executive would have to balance in relation to a hypothetical 
fact scenario. The scenario presented supposes the facts of the case Ruka v 
Department of Social Welfare [1997] 1 NZLR 151 occurred in a marriage instead 
of a de facto relationship. This hypothetical scenario is used to explore the kind 
of balancing of considerations that the Chief Executive would be required to 
perform. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding the abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 15,500 words . 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The scheme of the Social Security Act 1964 provides for discretion in the 
recovery of debts due to the Crown. 1 The discretion is vested in the Chief 
Executive of the Ministry of Social Development. This paper will consider the 
obligations incumbent on the Chief Executive when exercising the discretion to 
recover due debts. The overriding concern is to ensure that any exercise of the 
discretion is sound in administrative law. 
The author will therefore propose some considerations the Chief Executive 
should take into account whenever called upon to make a decision. These 
considerations arise as a consequence of the intersection of administrative law and 
social security law in the Chief Executive's decision-making sphere. In some 
instances, the different considerations will conflict. This tension is the natural 
consequence of the Chief Executive' s fiscal accountability on the one hand and 
social responsibility on the other. The considerations to be taken into account are 
as follows: the se lf-imposed requirements of the Ministry's service charter; the 
scope of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction to investigate departmental decisions; the 
public finance dimension, which behoves chief executives to act in an efficient 
and fiscally responsible manner; and, finally , the nature, purpose and values of the 
Social Security legislation. 
The initial focu s of this paper will be a broad discussion of the theoretical 
nature of discre tionary decision making followed by an analysis of the re levant 
1 Director-General of Social Welfare v Attrill [ 1998] ZAR 368, 382 (HC) Doogue J. 
debt-recovery provisions of the Social Security Act. Once the statutory criteria 
have been set out, the author will discuss the framework for statutory appeals 
from the Chief Executive's decision and also investigate the possibility of judicial 
review of the exercise of the discretion. 
The exact content of the discretion will be analysed in relation to a 
particular fact scenario. The hypothetical scenario will be used as a case study by 
which the full implications of the Chief Executive's discretion can be explored. 
The scenario involves a situation where a person has improperly received a 
benefit whilst living in a relationship that involves extreme domestic violence. As 
the focus of this analysis is primarily to explore the administrative and social 
security law obligations on the Chief Executive, the case study will be limited to a 
comparison between the import of extreme violence in a de facto relationship, and 
the same level of violence in a marriage. 
The assessment involved in the case study requires careful consideration 
of two factors: the extent and level of violence in the relationship and the legal 
status of the debtor's relationship. The concern will be whether the Chief 
Executive can take into account domestic violence in the decision as to whether or 
not the debt should be recovered. The factual situation in the case of Ruka v 
Department of Social Welfare 2 will provide the benchmark for extreme violence. 
The oven-iding question will therefore reduce to whether the Chief Executive is 
able to idestep the legal status of the relationship in determining whether or not 
to recover a debt. 
2 Ruka, , Deparrment of Social Welfare [ 1997] I NZLR 154 (CA). 
2 
The analysis of the case study will flesh out the factors that the Chief 
Executive should take into account when exercising the discretion. The thesis of 
this paper is that proper consideration of all of the relevant considerations will 
result in the discretion being employed in an administratively correct manner. 
II THE DEBT SITUATION 
The Ministry has estimated that the debt owed by ex-beneficiaries is 
increasing by approximately $30 million a year. 3 Approximately 40% of the debt 
owed is due to innocent overpayments, while approximately 30% is the result of 
fraud or abuse of the benefit system.4 The Ministry's 2004 Statement of Intent 
succinctly identifies the policy for collecting such debt: 5 
The collection of such debt takes into account the individual's ability to repay and the 
management of the Crown's fiscal risk. Due consideration is given to ensuring debt 
repayments do not cause undue hardship or jeopardise a client's abi lity to stay in 
employment through unrealistic debt repayment levels. The Ministry takes a 'whole of 
the organisation' approach to debt prevention and ensures its staff carry out their duties 
with due diligence and respect for the rights of clients. 
The object of this paper will be to shore up this policy by providing a solid 
basis of administrative law considerations that can be drawn on when exercising 
the discretion. 
3 Ministry of Social Development "Briefing to the incoming Minister - 9 July 2003" 
<http://www.msd.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 September 2005). 
4 Ministry of Social Development " Briefing to the incoming Mini ster - 9 July 2003", above n 3. 
5 Ministry of Social Development "Statement of Intent 2004" <http://www.msd.govt.nz> (last 
accessed 28 September 2005). 
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III DISCRETION 
This paper is concerned with the legal framework within which the Chief 
Executive's discretionary powers are situated. However, it is important to 
acknowledge the vast theoretical backdrop against which any discussion of 
discretion takes place. KC Davis has defined discretion in the following way: "A 
public official has discretion whenever the effective limits of his power leave him 
free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction".
6 
Ronald 
Dworkin furthers thi s definition by acknowledging the limits that inevitably 
surround any discretionary power: " [D]iscretion, like the hole in the doughnut, 
does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding area of restriction".
7 
Therefore, "in order to describe what discretion officials have it is necessary to 
refer to the rules which define their latitude for choice" .
8 
Carl E Schneider9 identifies the relationship between rules and discretion 
as being finely balanced. The central problem is that the severity of some rules 
can to some extent be ameliorated by allowing administrators some discretion, yet 
this allocation opens up the potential for abuse. 10 Schneider believes that lawyers 
tend to think of discretion as deriving from a gap. Relevant here is the gap in a 
statutory provision when " interpreted from the perspective of a regime of rules".
11 
This conceptualisation is sim il ar to Dworkin's analysis. It will be argued below 
6 Roy Stainsbury "Admin istrative Justice: Discretion and Procedure in Social Security Decision 
Making" in Keith Hawkins (ed) The Uses of Discretio11 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) 297. 
7 Sainsbury, above n 6, 297. 
8 Sainsbury, above n 6, 298. 
9 Carl E Schneider "Discrelion and Rules - A Lawyer's View" in Kei1h Hawkins (ed) The Uses of 
Discretion (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992). 
10 Schneider, above n 9, 47. 
11 Schneider, above n 9, 5 I. 
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that the provisions relating to debt recovery in the Social Security Act provide just 
such a gap. 
The gap theory can be articulated in another way. Robert E Goodin 12 
addresses Dworkin's theory and concludes that defining discretion as a hole in an 
doughnut is essentially a negative analysis in that it regards discretion as "a 
residual notion, defined in terms of its opposite: viz, official outcomes ... being 
strictly determined by rules and rules alone". 13 On this analysis, "discretion refers 
to an area of conduct which is generally governed by rules but where the dictates 
of the rules are indeterminate. In short, discretion refers, negatively, to a lacuna in 
a system of rules". 14 Again, the discretionary provision which provides the 
subject-matter of this paper can be viewed as being just such a lacuna. 
DJ Galligan 15 addresses the question of the correct legal approaches to be 
taken in relation to discretionary powers. Galligan begins the discussion by posing 
a central problem: 16 
If legality implies the exercise of authority through general rules, together with a 
functional and institutional division of law-makers and adjudicators, then the implications 
are clear: tha1 mode of law is in various respects incompatible with discretionary 
authority. 
12 Robert E Goodin " Welfare, Rights and Discretion" ( 1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 
13 Goodin, above n 12, 233. 
14 Goodin, above n 12, 234. 
15 DJ Galligan Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1986). 
16 Galligan, above n 15. 85. 
s 
One solution to this problem would be for the law-makers to be more explicit 
when drafting rules (legislation). Another option, as identified by Galligan, would 
be for the state to reduce the amount of regulation it undertakes. This argument is 
based on the primacy of the rule of law. If, on the basis of the quotation above, the 
state cannot effectively regulate "without undermining legality" then the state 
should limit itself to regulation "which can be pursued in harmony" with the 
values that are implicit in the rule of law.
17 
Galligan points out that this argument is premised on the assumption that a 
strict rendering of the rule of law is "more important than the objects and values 
achieved by discretionary regulation". 18 Although this argument has merit, 
Galligan believes that it is too narrow a view to say that the rule of law should 
have primacy in every circumstance. As the learned author points out, "the 
positive objects of regulation may represent values upon which great importance 
is placed, and there is no justification for conferring automatic priority upon the 
rule of law". 19 It is argued that this is especially the case in the social security area, 
where strict observance of rules will inevitably create distinctions that are unjust. 
This point will be thoroughly examined below in relation to the Social Security 
Act's treatment of different types of relationships in relation to debt recovery. 
The reference to the values achieved by discretionary regulation is an 
important one. The question here is to what extent values are important in 
construing a gap or a lacuna in a statute which gives rise to a discretionary power. 
This question is the central concern of this paper. The following quote from 
17 Galligan , above n 15 , 85. 
18 Galligan, above n 15, 85 . 
19 Galli gan , above n 15 , 86. 
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Galligan can be read as the theoretical sibling of the legal analysis of the debt 
recovery provisions in the Social Security Act which will follow: 20 
The view taken here is that there is no fundamental and irreducible legal idea or principle, 
but rather that law and legal institutions are part of the political and social composition of 
a society, and that they can be made instrumental in upholding values several and diverse. 
What those values are depends on the political theory and practice of a society, and once 
any particular value had been identified as important in this way, consideration can then 
be given as to how it is to be achieved effectively, and as to its relationship with other, 
possibly conflicting values. 
It is to these concerns, albeit in a legal discourse, that this paper will continually 
return. 
IV THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1964 
Section 85A of the Social Security Act 1964 (the "Act") provides that 
overpayments of a benefit or wrong payment of a benefit constitutes a debt to the 
Crown. Section 86(1) outlines what the Chief Executive may do in order to 
recover a debt refened to in s 85A, there being three options: proceedings brought 
in the name of the chief executive; deductions from benefits or student allowances; 
and, deductions from grants of special assistance made under an approved welfare 
programme. 
Section 86( l A) states that s 86(1) is subject to subsections (9A) and (9B), 
and to any regulations made under s 132G. Importantly, s 86(1) provides that in 
20 Galligan, above n 15 , 89-90. 
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order to recover a debt referred to in s 85A, the Chief Executive may employ one 
of the three modes of recovery. The implication is that the section does not require 
the chief executive to take one of the three options or indeed any recovery 
proceeding at all. This approached was affirmed in the Attrill decision, where 
Doogue J, in referring to the word "may", stated the following:
21 
[The word may] of itself shows that there is no statutory obligation upon the [chief 
executive] to take one or other of the courses defined in the various parts of ss 86( I)-
(l)(D) against the recipient of an overpayment. It is impossible to read into the particular 
provisions a statutory obligation upon the [chief executive] to take either of the courses of 
action identified in each of the subsections. 
Two further High Court cases considered the discretionary nature of s 
86(1), both of which ultimately agree with Attrill. In McConkey v Director-
General of Work and Income New Zealand,22 Goddard J believed that the fact that 
the discretionary nature of the establishment and recovery of debts under the Act 
was "beyond doubt" 23 Her Honour agreed with Doogue Jin Attrill that given the 
estoppel provision in s 86(9A), which essentially prohibits the chief executive 
from recovering in specified circumstances, the discretion under s 86(1) was not 
completely unfettered. Factors such as "insolvency or uneconomic commercial 
retum"24 could also have the potential to force the arm of the chief executive into 
not recovering the debt. Similarly, Young J in Moody v Chief Executive of the 
Department of Work and Income 25 recognised the discretionary nature of the Act 
2 1 Director-General of Social Welfare v Attrill [ 1998] NZAR 368, 382 (HC) Doogue J. 
22 McConkey v Director-General of Work and Income New Zealand, High Court, Wellington, 
AP277/00 ( 14 August 2002). 
23 ~ 
McConkey, above, n 22, 9 Goddard J. 
24 • 
McC011key, above, n 22, 9 Goddard J. 
25 Moody v Chief faecwi, •e of Work and Income [200 I] NZAR 608 (HC) Young J. 
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m asserting that there "is no obligation m law on the Department to recover 
overpayments". 26 
We can therefore proceed on the assumption that the Chief Executive has a 
power, not an obligation to recover debts. This power under s 86(1) is subject to s 
86(9A) which prohibits the Chief Executive from recovery if four circumstances 
are satisfied: first, the overpayment was caused by an error to which the debtor 
did not intentionally contribute; secondly, the debtor received the sum in good 
faith; thirdly, the debtor changed his or her position in reliance of the assumed 
validity of the overpayment; and finally , that it would be inequitable to order 
recovery. 27 After the 2002 Amendment, it is clear that the word "error" ins 86(9A) 
refers to an error committed by a departmental officer. This was the view taken 
earlier by Tipping Jin Southern District Review Committee v Baird.28 The Social 
Services Select Committee report on the 2002 Amendment argued that the 
definition of 'error' that the High Court laid down in Moody, as encompassing any 
overpayment, was inconsistent with the intent of the original legislation.29 
This analysis differs from the view given by Mackinnon in the Social 
Welfare edition of The Laws of New Zealand.30 Mackinnon's interpretation of s 
86 is that the Chief Executive can only write-off the debt where s 86(9A) comes 
into play. The argument advanced here is that s 86(1), whilst being subject to s 
86(9A), is still a discretionary provision in itself. That is, it is conceivable that 
26 Moody, above, n 25, 615. 
27 Social Security Act 1964, section 86(9A). 
28 Sowhern District Review Co111111ittee v Baird [ 1993) NZAR 280 (HC) Tipping J. 
29 Social Services Select Committee Report on the Social Security (Working Towards 
Employment) Amendment Bill 2002 (27/05/2002) 10. <http ://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz> (last 
acces ed 28 September 2005). 
30 The Lcm·s of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1994) Social Welfare, para 42. 
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there will be situations in which the Chief Executive will not wish to recover the 
debt, yet the facts of the situation do not fit within the s 86(9A) estoppel criteria. 
This argument is based on the decisions in Attrill, McConkey, and Moody. 
A Overpayment Due to Error: Section 86(9A) 
This estoppel-Jike provision will come in to play in the second scenario 
illustrated above, where there has been an overpayment of a benefit due to an 
administrative error. Owens v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social 
Development3 1 is the most recent inquiry as to the elements of s 86(9A) before its 
amendment in 2002. In this form, the provision read: 
the [chief executive] may, [in the chief executive's discretion], authorise the provisional 
writing-off of a debt which arose as a result of an error not intentionally contributed to by 
the debtor if the [chief executive] is satisfied that the person receiving the amount so paid 
in error did so in good faith and has so altered his position in reliance on the validity of 
the payment that it would be inequitable in all the circumstances, including his financial 
circum tances, to require repayment. 
Owens concerned a client of the Ministry who did not disclose a property 
interest on a benefit application form. The client was receiving rent from the 
property interest while at the same time receiving an accommodation supplement. 
The property interest had the effect of disentitling the client from receiving the 
benefit. Miller J considered whether negligence on the part of the beneficiary 
31 Owens v Chief Executive of 1he Mi11is1ry of Social Develop111en1, High Court, Wellington, CIV 
2003-485-2763 (10 March 2005) Miller J. 
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could be taken into account as a factor determining the use of the discretion, 
negligence in this case meaning "carelessness or inattention".32 
His Honour was of the opinion that the error and good faith requirements 
were simply "pre-requisites to the exercise of the discretion" and that upon the 
discretion arising "the subsection does not expressly limit the circumstances that 
may be taken into account in determining whether repayment would be 
inequitable". 33 Therefore, factors extraneous to the elements of the provision, 
such as negligence on the part of the beneficiary, may be taken into account. His 
Honour then considered the relative meaning of "inequitable" in so far as it related 
to the Chief Executive 's decision whether or not it would be inequitable to 
recover the debt. Drawing on the decisions in Karl v ACC,34 National Bank of 
New 'Zealand v Waitaki International Processing, 35 and MacMillan Builders 
Limited v Morningside Industries Limited,36 it was held that the word "carried the 
connotation of 'unfair or unjust' , which allowed the Court to consider relative 
fault". 37 
B 2002 Amendment 
The amended version of s 86(9A) now reads: 
32 Owens, above n 31, para 40, Mi I !er J. 
31 Owens, above n 3 l , para 42 , Mi Iler J. 
3
~ Karl v ACC, High Court, Wellington , CIV 2004-485-800 (9 September 2004). 
35 National Bank of New Zealand v Waitaki lntemational Processing [ 1999] 2 NZLR 211. 
J
6 MacMillan Builders Limited v Momi11gside !11d11 stries Limited [ 1986] 2 ZLR 12. 
J? Owens , above n 31, para 43, Miller J. 
11 
The chief executi ve may not recover any sum comprising that part of a debt that was 
caused wholly or partly by an error to which the debtor did not intentionally contribute 
if -
(a) the debtor -
(i) received the sum in good faith; and 
(ii) changed hi s or her posit.ion in the belief that he or she was entitled to 
that sum and would not have to pay or repay that sum to the chief 
executi ve; and 
(b) it would be inequitable in all the circumstances, including the debtor's financial 
circumstances, to permit recovery. 
At first blush there appears to be quite a significant difference between this 
amended provision and the former one. The language "may not recover" in the 
amended provision is ostensibly more restrictive than the wider ambit given in the 
original. However, it is argued that for all material purposes the Chief Executive's 
discretion still exists in its entirety. This conclusion is reached by deconstructing 
the statutory language. The e lements of not intentionally contributing to the error, 
of acting in good faith, and of alteration of position in reliance are, in the words of 
Miller J in Owens, merely "pre-requisites" to the exercise of discretion that occurs 
in subsection (b ). Therefore, a beneficiary needs to establish that they conform to 
all the formative elements in order to be in a position where the Chief Executive 
can balance the equities of their case. It is this balancing exercise that the Chief 
Executive should have recourse to the relevant considerations canvassed below. 
V THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CONTEXT 
12 
Disgruntled debtors have both appeal and review options open to them if 
they are unsatisfied with any decision concerning the recovery of a debt. The 
appeal mechanism in the Act has several layers. The first option is to request the 
Ministry convene a benefit review committee, which is constituted under s 10(3) 
of the Act and comprises one person appointed by the Minister to represent the 
community and two officers of the Department appointed by the Chief Executive. 
Section 12A of the Act establishes the Social Security Appeal Authority 
(the "Appeal Authority"), which, under s 121 has the ability to act as a judicial 
authority for the purpose of hearing appeals. Section 121(2) provides that "" m 
hearing and determining any appeal [the Appeal Authority] shall have all the 
powers, duties, functions and discretions that the Chief Executive had in respect 
of the same matter".38 Appeals to the Appeal Authority can be brought under s 
12J. If the appellant is dissatisfied with the Appeal Authority's decision, s 12Q 
provides a right of appeal to the High Court by means of a case stated appeal on a 
point of law only. 
It is worth noting here that John Hughes39 has levelled strong criticism at 
the appeal process provided for by the Act. Hughes points out that the problem of 
a lack of independence at the benefit review committee stage is acute. The two 
departmental officers, Hughes argues, "are generally close colleagues of the 
decision-maker, given that each office operates its own committee".40 This can 
have the effect of rendering the "community representative" superfluous as s 
10A(6) provides that the finding of the committee is constituted by the decision of 
38 Social Security Act J 964, s J 21(2). 
39 John Hughes "Social Security: Time to Review the Reviewers" (2001) ELB 133. 
40 Hughes. above n 39, 134. 
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any two members. Furthermore, there is no requirement for expertise in social 
security law "of any of the committee members and the departmental committee 
members are not specialists".41 Hughes concedes the independence of the Appeal 
Authority, yet labels this process as "cumbersome, complex and - in some cases -
long drawn out".42 
The Act therefore provides for a structured process of appeals from 
decisions of the Chief Executive to recover debt. However, it is also possible for 
the debtor to make an application for judicial review of the decision of the Chief 
Executive, the benefit review committee or the Appeal Authority. The avenue of 
judicial review exists alongside the right of appeal given in the Act as it derives 
from the "High Court's inherent jurisdiction to rule on the legality of public 
acts"43 and can therefore not be supplanted by a simple statutory appeal right. 
In the social security area, the distinction between appeal and review was 
briefly dealt with in Gould v Chief Executive of the Department of Work and 
Income. 44 In that case the appellant sought to have reinstated judicial review 
claims relating to a decision of the Appeal Authority that had previously been 
struck out on the grounds that they were out of time. Master Venning declined to 
reinstate the judicial review proceedings on the basis that they were seeking to 
challenge the merits of the Appeal Authority's decision and not its procedure. The 
Master pointed to the availability of the appeal mechanism in s 12Q of the Act as 
41 Hughes, above n 39, 134. 
42 Hughes, above n 39, l 34. 
43 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in Ne1, · Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 200 l) 733. 
44 Gould v Chief Execwive of the Department of Work and lnco111e, High Court, Auckland, 
AP 19/02 ( 18 July 2003) Master Venning. 
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a "particularly material factor in the exercise of the discretion as to whether or not 
the Court may grant the remedy of judicial review". 45 The implication of the 
judgement is that the grounds of review must add something that cannot be dealt 
with on the appeal on a point of law under s 12Q of the Act. 
The authors of the Laws of New Zealand characterise the distinction 
between appeal and review as follows: 46 
Review is concerned with the legality of the decision, whether it was reached "in 
accordance with law, fairly and reasonably". The Court asks whether the decision should 
be set aside or allowed to stand. Appeal, by comparison, entails adjudication on the merits 
and may involve the Court substituting its decision for that of the decision-maker. 
In Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corp of New Zealand, 47 Lord 
Templeman cited with approval the speech of Lord Brightman in Chief Constable 
of North Wales Police v Evans,48 as setting out the proper function of the courts 
on review:49 
Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. 
Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will ... under the 
guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself usurping power. 
However, the question for the court on review is to what extent it can go to in 
order to ensure that the decision was made in accordance with law and was fair 
45 Gould, above n 44, para 20, Master Venning. 
46 The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 2003) Constitutional Law, para 114. 
41 Merl'llry Energy Ltd v Electricity Corp of New Zealand [ 1994] 2 NZLR 385 (PC). 
48 Chief Constable of North Wales Police v Evans [ 1982] 1 WLR 1155, 1173. 
49 MerCL1ry Energy, above n 47. 389 (PC) Lord Templeman. 
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and reasonable. Joseph argues that a "continuum can be drawn between 
procedural impropriety at one end (review of the process of decision-making) and 
irrationality at the other (merits-based review), with illegality lying somewhere in 
between".50 
The courts have and will entertain applications for judicial review against 
chief executives of government departrnents.51 An example of this is Ngai Tahu 
Maori Trust Board v Director-General of Conservation, 
52 
where the Court of 
Appeal heard an application for judicial review on the basis that "the Director-
General ought to have consulted Ngai Tahu interests before" granting a whale-
watching permit. 53 A further example is Patel v Chief Executive of the 
Department of Labour, 54 which concerned the refusal of the New Zealand 
Immigration Service to grant a residence permit. 
It now falls to determine what grounds of judicial review are relevant to 
the exercise of the Chief Executive's discretion to recover debt. Implicit in this 
inquiry is the question outlined above - to what extent may the court go in 
assessing the merits, rather than the procedure of the Chief Executive's decision. 
Of particular relevance here is the statement in the dissenting judgment of Thomas 
J in Waitakere City Council v Lovelock that "it is certain that the Courts will 
50 Philip Joseph Constitwional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington , 2001) 736. 
5 1 Joseph, above n 50, 748. 
52 Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director-General of Conservation [ 1995] 3 NZLR 553 (CA). 
53 Ngai Taint, above n 52, 556, Cooke P. 
54 Patel v Chief Executive of the Department of Labo11 r [ 1997] I NZLR I 02. 
16 
respond in the application of administrative law principles to the changing needs, 
perceptions and expectations of the community".55 
A Procedural Impropriety 
This ground of review holds the decision-maker to the requirements of 
natural justice. This ground of review "is pre-eminently about the decision-
making process, and adheres most closely to the appeal/review distinction".56 A 
subset of this ground of review is the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which 
was first coined by Lord Denning in Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home 
A.ffairs.57 The doctrine of legitimate expectation is potentially relevant to the Chief 
Executive's discretion in relation to the standards Work and Income imposes on 
itself by way of its service charter. This point will be explored further below. 
B Irrationality or unreasonableness 
In Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation58 
Lord Greene MR agreed that if a decision-maker made a decision " that no 
reasonable could ever have come to" then the courts could interfere with that 
decision.59 However, His Lordship stated that "to prove a case of that kind would 
55 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock [ 1997] 2 NZLR 385, 399-400 (CA) Thomas J di ssenting. 
56 Joseph, above n 50, 736. 
57 Schmidt v Secretary of State f or Home Affairs [ 1969] 2 Ch 149 (CA). 
58 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Lid v Wednesbury Corporation (1948] I KB 223 . 
59 Wed11 esbury, above n 58, 230 (CA) Lord Greene MR. 
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require something overwhelming".60 Joseph points out that in New Zealand the 
courts have, over time, lowered the Wednesbury threshold.
61 
Of relevance here is the related ground of substantive unfairness. This 
doctrine was recognised in Thames Valley Electric Power Board v NZFP Pulp & 
Paper Ltd, 62 which Cooke P labelled as a "legitimate ground of judicial review, 
shading into but not identical with unreasonableness".
63 This ground goes beyond 
the procedure of a decision and looks at its quality in order to determine whether 
or not it was unfair. 64 Dr Rodney Harrison QC 
65 argues that substantive 
unfairness as a ground of judicial review is wider than legitimate expectation as it 
is "by definition not dependent on the existence of any legitimate expectation, and 
would appear to permit the Court to have regard to a much broader assessment in 
terms of overall fairness".
66 
Carmichael v Director-General of Social Welfare
67 
directly dealt with 
some of these administrative law concepts in a social security context. The case 
concerned overpayment of national superannuation. The Appeal Authority found 
that, in the main, the requirements of s 86(9A) were satisfied however the money 
should still be repaid because of additional capital the appellants possessed. 
Smellie J considered that the appellants claim of unreasonableness was not 
60 Wednesbury , above n 58, 230 (CA) Lord Greene MR. 
61 Joseph, above n 50, 836. 
62 Thames Valley Electric Power Board v NZFP Pulp & Paper Ltd [ 1994] 2 NZLR 641 (CA). 
63 Thames Valley, above n 62, 652, Cooke P. 
6-1 Philip Joseph Constit111ional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 200 l) 739. 
65 Dr Rodney Harri son QC "Judicial Review: Recent Trends" ( 1999) NZU 264. 
66 Harri son, above n 65, 268. 
67 Carmichael 1· Director-General of Social Welfare [ 1994] NZFLR 769 (HC). 
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improperly motivated and was highly relevant to the case. His Honour held the 
following: 68 
I have reached the conclusion that the ... decision which the SSAA upheld on appeal ... 
was both unreasonable and unfair in the restricted administrative law sense .... The 
requirements of s 86(9A) had all but been satisfied. In all other respects it would have 
been inequitable (unjust) to require repayment. No reasonable person could then sensibly 
take the view that solely because of the applicant's modest home and limited savings the 
opposite conclusion was justified. 
This reasoning demonstrates that the courts wi II not accept decisions about 
debt recovery based solely on technical, narrow interpretations. The emphasis 
must be broader and appeal to a range of considerations, including overall fairness. 
This point will be addressed in more detail below. 
C Illegality 
This ground of review is the most pertinent to the Chief Executive's 
discretion. Joseph identifies two situations in which illegality can be pleaded:69 
The deciding body may enter an inquiry beyond its statutory purpose (error of law at the 
outset), or it may commit a procedural error or fail to address mandatory relevant 
considerations or be influenced by irrelevant ones (error of law in the course of its 
inquiry). 
68 Car111ichael, above n 67, 777, Smellie J. 
69 Joseph, above n 64, 737. 
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The relevant aspects of illegality here are the concepts of acting for an improper 
purpose, the duty to act consistently and the question of relevant and irrelevant 
considerations. 
1 Improper purpose 
This subset of illegality concerns the delegation of the discretionary power 
given by the statute. Therefore, a "power granted for one purpose must be used for 
that purpose and not for some unauthorised or collateral purpose".70 The authors 
of the Laws of New Zealand point out that no "authority has an unfettered 
discretion in the exercise of a power" and that powers "must be used to promote 
the policy and objects of the empowering statute".71 This point was clearly made 
by the House of Lords in Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food. 72 
The limit of the Chief Executive's discretion then is the purpose of the Social 
Security Act. This analysis can draw on the discussion of the wider nature and 
purpose of social security as discussed below, but it equally involves a strict legal 
assessment of what Parliament was trying to achieve by enacting the legislation. 
An example of this approach was the High Court's assessment of the then 
Accident Compensation Act 1982 in New Zealand Society of Physiotherapists v 
70 Joseph , above n 64, 789. 
71 The Laws of New Zealand (Bullerwonhs, Wellington, 2003) Administrative Law, para 33. 
12 Padfield v Minister of Agrirnlture, Fisheries and Food [ 1968] AC 997. See Joseph, above n 64, 
790. 
Accident Compensation Corporation. 73 It is worth setting out a passage from 
Quilliam J' s judgement in order to demonstrate the kind of analysis required: 74 
ln my view, when construing this statute it is necessary at all times to bear in mind the 
purpose for which it was passed. It was to provide, in substitution for previously existing 
rights to claim damages or workers' compensation, an obligation on the State ... to 
compensate those injured on a comprehensive basis and without reference to fault. It was, 
as I have understood it, a form of statutory insurance. 
Another example of the courts determining the bounds of a statute in reference 
to an administrative decision comes from the case Southern Ocean Trawlers Ltd v 
Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries. 75 In that case Cooke P was 
prepared to inquire whether a decision was "within the policy and spirit of the 
Act".
76 
It is argued that this is a significant extension of simply looking at the 
purpose of an act. If one is to look at the spirit of the Act, then not only 
parliamentary purpose but also the values of the subject-matter generally can be 
imputed into the determination as to whether a particular decision is within the 
bounds of the statute. 
2 The duty to act consistently 
The duty involves both procedural and a substantive elements in that 
"decision-makers must be consistent in the procedures and criteria they apply 
73 
New Zealand Society of Physiotherapists v Accident Compensation Corporation [ 1988) 1 NZLR 
346 (HC). 
14 
New Zealand Society of Physiotherapists, above n 73,353, Quilliam J. 
75 
Southern Ocean Trawlers Ltd v Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries [ 1993) 2 NZLR 
53 (CA). 
76 Sowhem Ocean Trawlers Ltd, above n 75 , 6 I, Cooke P. 
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(procedural consistency), and that like cases ought to be decided alike (substantive 
consistency)". 77 In Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uclaf 
Australia Pty Ltd 78 the Court of Appeal considered the question whether, as the 
respondent had asserted, the appellant had "failed to act even-handedly" which 
resulted in the respondent's contention "that it did not receive equal treatment".
79 
Thomas J, adopting as correct a passage from de Smith, Woolf & JoweU,
80 
stated 
that "consistent application of the law possesses a value in its own right - that of 
ensuring that all persons similarly situated will be treated equally by those who 
apply the law".81 His Honour went further, believing that "the notion that like 
should be treated alike has been an essential tenet in the theory of law" .
82 
3 The taking into account of relevant and irrelevant considerations 
Joseph states the principle thus:
83 
The exercise of a discretionary power, even for a proper purpose, may be invalid if the 
decision-maker is influenced by considerations that ought not to be taken into account, or 
if the decision-maker fails to take account of relevant considerations. 
It has been established that s 86(1) and s 86(9A) provide for a discretion but do 
not give any indication, or factors that the Chief Executive should take into 
77 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 798. 
?S Phar111ace11tical Management Agency Ltd v Ro11ssel Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd [ 1988] NZAR 58 
(CA). 
79 Pharmaceutical Management, above n 78 , 71-72, Thomas J. 
80 SA de Smith , Harry Woolf, and Jeffery Jowell Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995) 577. 
8 1 Phar111acet11ica/ Management, above n 78, 72. Thomas J. 
82 Pharmaceutical Management, above n 78 , 72, Thomas J. 
83 Joseph , above n 77, 793. 
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account when exercising the discretion. In situations such as this, where no 
criteria are given, "considerations relevant to the exercise of discretion must be 
construed from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act".
84 In Kearn v 
Minister of Works and Development 
85 Somers J made it clear that the court is not 
concerned with the conclusion reached by the decision-maker, but that they 
appropriately balanced the correct factors.
86 
In light of this administrative law backdrop, especially in respect of the 
fact that the Act does not provide any plain criteria to aid the Chief Executive's 
discretion under s 86(1) and s 86(9A), it is necessary to discuss what some of the 
relevant considerations entail. The following analysis, of necessity, will draw on 
both legal principles and more general values that attach to the existence and 
operation of the Act. It is in this analysis that the potentially conflicting 
obligations of the Chief Executive are borne out. 
VI RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS IN THE EXERCISE OF THE 
DISCRETION 
It is argued that if the following factors are taken into account by the Chief 
Executive any use of the discretion to recover debts would be sound in 
administrative and social security law. 
A The Department of Work and Income Service Charter 
8
~ Joseph, above n 77, 794. 
85 Kea111 1• Minister of Works and Develop111e11t [ 1982] I NZLR 319 (CA). 
86 Kea111 v Minister of Works and Develop111ent, above n 85, 327-328, Somers J. 
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Work and Income's own Service Charter was de
veloped collaboratively 
with community and advocacy groups, other gove
rnment departments, clients and 
staff. 87 The preamble to the Charter explains to clie
nts that the Department aims to 
provide them with the highest level of service. Th
e Charter is addressed to clients 
and sets out what they can expect from the Depar
tment. Under the heading "We 
will" are listed ten aspects of the Department's fu
nctions. Of relevance here are 
the following undertakings: to give prompt and eff
icient service; to give the client 
the assistance they are entitled to; to explain the c
lient's rights and obligations; to 
be understanding and caring about the client's need
s; and, to be professional in the 
way the Ministry serves the client.SS 
Following this is another subheading entitled "Y
ou have the right to", 
under which eleven rights are set out. Of relevanc
e here are the rights to be given 
correct information and entitlements, and also the r
ight to make a complaint or ask 
for a review if the client disagrees with the Ministr
y's decisions.s
9 
The assurances set out in the Charter do not 
have the force of law. 
However, it is clear that the Department has gone
 to some lengths to produce the 
document and must by implication see itself as at 
least morally bound by its terms. 
The question is to what extent, if any, the Ch
arter binds the Department in 
administrative law. An argument is made here tha
t the terms of the Charter create 
a legitimate expectation that they will be adhered t
o. 
87 The Department of Work and Income Service Cha
rter <http://www.workandincome.govt.nz> 
(last accessed 28 September 2005). 
88 The Department of Work and Income Service Cha
rter, above n 87. 
89 The Department of Work and Income Service Cha
rter, above n 87. 
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I Legitimate expectation in public law 
Legitimate expectations in public law were first given effect to in Schmidt 
v Secretary of State for Home Affairs. 90 As Joseph points out, a "legitimate 
expectation trips the requirements of natural justice (or fairness) before a decision 
may be made that affects one's rights or interests".91 The essence of the doctrine 
is that a public body or official cannot "defeat a legitimate expectation without 
affording interested parties ... the rights to be informed or heard".92 Importantly, a 
legitimate expectation "may arise from assurances or promises given" and from 
"(p]ublic statements of policy by word or deed".93 
In A-G (Hong Kong) v Ng Yeun Shiu, 94 the Privy Council considered a 
change of immigration policy implemented by the Hong Kong government. The 
plaintiff argued that he had not been able to put forward his case as to why he 
should not be deported. Lord Fraser held that as part of its policy, the government 
had created a legitimate expectation for people in the position of the plaintiff. In 
recognising the concept was legally relevant, his Lordship stated:95 
The justification for it is primarily that, when a public authority has promised to follow a 
certain procedure, it is in the interests of good admini stration that it should act fairly and 
should implement its promise, so long as the implementation does not interfere with its 
statutory duty. 
90 Schmidt v Secreta1y of Srarefor Home Affairs (196912 Ch 149 (CA). 
91 Philip Joseph Consrirwional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 850. 
92 Joseph, above n 91, 85 l. 
93 Joseph, above n 9 l , 85 l. 
94 A-G (Hong Kong) v Ng Ye1m Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629 (PC). 
95 A-G (Hong Kong), above n 94,638 (PC) Lord Fraser. 
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In cases such as Ng Yeun Shiu, where a right of hearing is given, the courts 
will uphold this as legitimate. Simon France has argued that the same requirement 
can equally apply to cases where a benefit is promised, as "what gives rise to the 
legitimate expectation is the express undertaking" .
96 
This view is supported by 
Sales and Steyn,97 who further assert that the doctrine extends to "the procedure 
which the decision-maker will adopt before taking the decision how to exercise its 
d
. · ,, 98 
1scret1onary power . 
A material concern of the present discussion is whether the doctrine can 
apply if the claimant in question was unaware of the practice, promise, or 
statement of the public body or person. Joseph notes that the courts are divided on 
this point. In Lawson v Housing New Zealand,
99 
it was held that a person wishing 
to invoke a legitimate expectation must be aware of the information that allegedly 
gives rise to it. However, the High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh100 took a different approach. The question in that case 
was whether an international human rights instrument had the ability to create a 
legitimate expectation that its provisions would be followed. The Court answered 
in the affirmative. Mason CJ and Deane J relevantly held:
101 
96 Simon France "Legitimate Expectations in New Zealand" 14 (1990) ZULR 123, 139. 
97 
Philip Sales and Karen Steyn, " Legitimate Expectations in English Public Law: an Analysis" 
(2004) P L 564. 
98 Sales and Steyn, above n 97, 565. See the authors discussion of R v Devo11 CC Exp. Baker 
{ 1995] l All ER 73 in footnote 6, where reference is drawn to Simon Brown LJ ' s fourth 
cla sification of legitimate expectation. Here "the claimant may have a legitimate expectation that 
a particular procedure, not otherwise required by law in the protection of an interest, must be 
followed consequent upon some specific promise or practice" . 
99 Lawson v Housing New Zeala11d [ 1997] 2 NZLR 474 (HC). 
100 Mi11ister for /111111igration and E1h11ic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 (HCA). 
10 1 Teoh, above n 100, 291 , Mason CJ and Deane J. 
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It is not necessary that a person seek.ing to set up such a legitimate expectation should be 
aware of the Convention or should personally entertain the expectation; it is enough that 
the expectation is reasonable in the sense that there are adequate materials to support it. 
Given this brief summary of the doctrine, the issue here is whether the 
assurances the Department sets out in its own Charter create legitimate 
expectations that the client can have. A decision made by the chief executive 
under either s 86(1) ors 86(9A) of the Act to recover debt will clearly affect the 
rights and interests of the debtor concerned. Furthermore, the act of making the 
decision will of necessity trigger certain obligations the chief executive has by 
virtue of the Charter. 
Alternatively, recourse may also be had to the illegality ground identified 
above. As Wade points out, it " has several times been held that a non-contractual 
undertaking may bind a public body".
102 In R v Liverpool Cpn exp. Liverpool 
Taxi Fleet Operators' Association,103 a taxicab licensing authority was held to an 
undertaking it made regarding the issuing of licences. The idea that an authority 
can bind itself by its own publicised standards or procedures has become 
entrenched to the extent that a "breach of an undertaking may lead to inconsistent 
and unfair action amounting either to an abuse of power or else to a breach of the 
principles of natural justice". 104 
In Chiu v Minister of Immigration 105 Fisher J acknowledged the potential 
for illegality if a decision-maker misinterprets or improperly applies self-imposed 
102 William Wade Administrative Law (6ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, I 988) 380. 
103 R v Liverpool Cpn exp. Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association [1972) 2 QB 299. 
i o.i Wade, above n I 02, 380. 
105 Chiu v Minister of !111111igratio11 [ 19941 2 NZLR 541 (CA). 
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rules. His Honour was of the opinion that in "the majority of cases the 
misinterpretation will vitiate the decision upon the ground that it constitutes an 
error of law ... , produces unreasonableness in the administrative sense . .. , [or) 
frustrates a legitimate expectation". 106 Gallen J in Northern Roller Mining Co Ltd 
v Commerce Commission107 echoed a similar sentiment in stating that a decision 
may be erroneous either for misdirection or irrationality if "the decision-making 
authority has indicated the criteria which will be taken into account in arriving at 
[a) decision, but proceeds on some other basis" .
108 
For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to answer these questions 
directly , except to say that it is possible that such findings could be made. Fisher 
J's decision in Chiu is good authority on this point. In light of this possibility , the 
real point to be made here is that the requirements of the Charter must be a 
consideration in the Chief Executive's mind when a decision is made as to 
whether or not to recover a debt. 
B Ombudsmen Act 1975 
Where a client feels aggrieved by the Ministry's conduct in any matter, it 
1s open to that person to make a complaint to the Ombudsman under the 
Ombudsmen Act 1975. The relevant provisions are sections 13, 18, and 22. 
Section 13 empowers the Ombudsman to investigate "any decision or 
recommendation made, or any act done or omitted ... relating to a matter of 
106 Chiu, above n 105, 550, Fisher J. 
101 Northern Roller Mining Co Ltd v Commerce Commission [ 1994) 2 NZLR 747 (HC). 
!OS Northern Roller Mining Co Ltd v Commerce Commission, above n 107, 754, Gallen J. 
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administration and affecting any person or body of persons in his or its personal 
capacity". 109 Section 18 enables the Ombudsman to "hear or obtain information 
from such persons as he thinks fit , and may make such enquiries as he thinks 
fit". II 0 
Section 22 details the procedure for the Ombudsman's report after the 
completion of his or her investigation . The Ombudsman has the power to examine 
any decision or recommendation to determine whether or not it was "unreasonable, 
unjust, oppressive, or improperly discriminatory". 111 Relevantly, subsection (2) 
provides: 
The provisions of this section shall also apply in any case where an Ombudsman is of the 
opinion that in the making of the decision or recommendation, or in the doing or omiss ion 
of the act, a discretionary power has been exercised for an improper purpose or on 
irrelevant grounds or on the taking into account of irrelevant considerations". 
Under subsection (3), the Ombudsman is also empowered to investigate and make 
recommendations to the effect that any law or practice which a decision was 
predicated upon should be re-evaluated. 11 2 
On the basis of this statutory framework, the Ombudsman has the ability 
to investigate any decision or recommendation made by the Ministry, and write an 
opinion making such recommendations as thought fit. It is important to note that 
in the exercise of this function, the Ombudsman has the ability to comment on 
109 Ombudsmen Act 1975, section 13. 
I JO Ombudsmen Act 1975 , section 18. 
111 Ombudsmen Act 1975 , section 22( I )(b). 
11 2 Ombudsmen Act 1975, sections 22(3)(d) and (e). 
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both administrative actions and the state of the Jaw upon which those actions were 
taken. Doogue J in Chief Executive of the Department of Work and Income v 
Scoble113 acknowledged that recourse to the Ombudsman can be had in the wake 
of decisions concerning benefit entitlement.
114 
Therefore, when exercising the discretion whether or not to recover a debt 
due, the Chief Executive should consider the potential for an adverse finding by 
the Ombudsman in the event that a complaint is made. Two things should be 
borne in mind here: first, the bases for the decision to recover (or not); and 
secondly, the reasonableness or the clarity of the law upon which the decision is 
made. If there exists any uncertainty in the law, through conflicting precedent or 
inconclusive interpretation, the Chief Executive should be aware of any anomaly 
and seek to make a reasonable decision in light of that. The author will come back 
to this point in relation to the case study. 
C The Public Finance Dimension 
Another important consideration the chief executive should have in mind 
when exercising the discretion is the obligations owed to the public purse. These 
obligations manifest themselves principally through three Acts of Parliament: The 
Public Finance Act 1989 (sections 34-37), the Public Audit Act 2001 (section 16), 
and the State Sector Act 1988 (section 32). 
11 3 Chief Execwive of the Deparr111e111 of Work and /11come v Scoble, High Court, Wellington, AP 
58/01 (3 August 2001) . 
114 Scoble, above, n 113. para 40, Doogue J. 
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Although these statutes p1imarily address the requisite fiscal responsibility 
of the Chief Executive, the State Sector Act also betrays some of the tension 
between fiscal accountability on the one hand and wider social obligations on the 
other. It is submitted that this is particularly the case in relation to the Chief 
Executive of the Ministry of Social Development, where the social responsibility 
incumbent in the job is clear cut. An example of this tension as reflected in the 
legislation comes from the long title to the State Sector Act, which relevantly 
provides that its purpose is to: 11 5 
(a) ensure that employees in the State services are imbued with the spirit of 
servi ce to the community, and 
(b) promote e ffi c iency in the State services, and 
(c) ensure the responsible management of State ervices 
In addition to this is s 32 of the State Sector Act, which is directed specifically at 
the Chief Executive, and provides that they shall be responsible for " [t]he efficient, 
effective, and economical management of the activities of the department". ' 16 
The responsibility of the Chief Executive goes beyond the tension 
identified and extends to the duty of loyalty to the government. Palmer 
h . h . . h 11 7 c aractenses t e pos1t1on t us : 
Chi ef executi ves have a difficult ba lancing ac t to ma intain - satisfying their lega l 
responsibilities, meeting their accountability requirements, and fulfillin g public 
11 5 State Sector Act 1988, Long Title. 
11 6 State Sector Act 1988, s 32(d). 
11 7 G W R Palmer and Matthew Pa lmer Bridled Power: New Zealand 's Constitution and 
Govem111em (4ed , Oxford Uni versity Press, Auckland, 2004) IOI . 
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expectations while remaining loyal to the government of the day and maintaining the trust 
of ministers. 
In his Ministerial Review of the Department of Child, Youth and Family 
Services 118 Judge Michael J A Brown found that there was a "conflict between the 
Chief Executive's responsibilities under the Children, Young Persons and their 
Families Act 1989, and the Public Finance Act 1989".
119 
In assessing this conflict, 
Judge Brown believed that the Department operated on the basis that:
120 
where the Chief Executive is unable to meet statutory expenditure obligations she may be 
in breach of her statutory duty but the duties under the Public Finance Act are paramount 
in any conflict between her statutory responsibilities. 
Judge Brown's study is an illuminating one, as the Chief Executive in the 
debt recovery situation under the Social Security Act must negotiate a similar 
tension. In Chief Executive of the Department of Work and Income v Vicary,
121 
Gendall J reflected on this problem:
122 
The concern and purpose of the Act is to aid those who truly are in need of financial 
assistance in a way that is administratively e fficient and not wasteful of public funds. 
Those considerations have to be balanced. 
11 8 Michae l J A Brown Care and Protection is About Adult Behaviour: The Ministerial Review of 
the Depa r1111e 111 of Child, Yo111h and Family Services (Report to the Minister of Social Services and 
Employment, the Honourable Steve Mahary) December 2000. 
11 9 Brown, above n l I 8, 2 1. 
120 Brown, above n 118, 24-25. 
12 1 Chief fa ecwive of the Department of Work and Income v Vicary, High Court, Wellington , AP 
158/00 ( 11 April 2001). 
122 Vican •, above, n 121, para 25, Gendall J . 
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In Hall v Director-General of Social Welfare, 123 McGechan J believed the 
decision maker "should be proactive in seeking welfare, and not defensive or 
bureaucratic". 124 
This paper makes no attempt to reconcile the tension between the social 
objectives of the legislation and the fiscal responsibilities incumbent on the Chief 
Executive. Such reconciliation is an impossible task in the abstract, as every 
situation will involve a different factual matrix and therefore it is best left to be 
judged on a case-by-case basis. It is enough that the tension is acknowledged. The 
principal concern 1s that the Chief Executive is aware of the very onerous 
financial obligations and that these are taken into account when considering 
questions of debt recovery. 
D The nature and purpose of social security 
Unlike the Social Security Act 1938, the 1964 statute does not contain a 
preamble or statement of principle. The Report of the Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into Social Security 1972125 found that the "Act did not lay down a clear 
set of community values and principles. Instead it prescribed some administrative 
techniques to define benefit categories and establish benefit leve ls and the method 
of financing them". 126 The Royal Commission acknowledged the distinctly 
pragmatic approach New Zealand has taken to social security, and thus believed 
123 Hall v Director-General of Social Welfare [ 1997] NZFLR 902 (HC). 
124 Hall, above n 123, 912, McGechan J. 
125 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social Security in New Zealand (Government 
Printer, We lling ton, 1972). 
126 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social Security in New Zealand. above n 125, 
SS. 
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that the system should not pursue romantic ends but rather operate as a practical, 
viable system which is "directed at the achievement of objectives rather than 
· d ,, 127 serving ogma . 
As such, the Commission concluded that the aims of the social security 
system should be a combination of the following: sustaining life and health; to 
ensure, within reason, that "everyone is able to enjoy a standard of living much 
like the rest of the community"; to improve the quality of life by income 
maintenance and other means; and, a need to co-ordinate "taxation, wages, 
employment, economic development, education, health, housing, social services, 
and cultural policies" with social security cash benefits.
128 
It is submitted that in 
light of the social outcomes of that the economic reforms of the late 1980s, early 
1990s have had on New Zealand life it is necessary to locate a more contemporary 
f · · l P9 statement o prmc1p e. -
The introduction of the Social Security Amendment Bi11
130 
to the House of 
Representatives by the Honourable Steve Maharey, Minister of Social Services 
and Employment, sounds a 'third-way' chord. 
131 
The Minister's speech 
emphasised that the Government's approach to beneficiaries was not punitive, but 
127 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social Security in New Zealand, above n 125, 
SS. 
128 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social Security in New Zealand, above n 125, 
SS. 
129 See Penelope J Brook Cowen "Neo-Liberali sm" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Politics 
in Transition (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 345-349 for a di sc ussion of the economic 
theory of the New Zealand reforms. See also Jane Kelsey The New Zealand Experiment (AuckJand 
University Press, Auckland, 1995) 271-296 for a discussion of what the author terms the "social 
defici t" that was produced by the reforms. 
130 ( 12 September 2000) ZPD 5450. 
131 See Paul Dalziel "Third Way Economics: What Might This Mean in New Zealand?" in The 
New Politics: a Third Way for New Zealand (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1999) for a 
disucussion of ' third way' principles. 
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rather stressed the time-honoured adage of balancing incentive to work with the 
provision of support where necessary. 
132 As such, the speech gets us no further 
than the Royal Commission. The statement of Gendall J in Vicary, as cited above, 
reflects the pragmatic attitude to social security. That is, assistance should be 
available where there is an established need, but the assistance is to be distributed 
in a manner that is "administratively efficient and not wasteful of public funds". 
133 
The author adopts Gendall J' s characterisation of social security as accurately 
reflecting the New Zealand position. 
VII THE CASE STUDY 
The author will now pose a particular hypothetical fact scenario in order to 
contextualise the Chief Executive's discretion. The scenario concerns clients of 
the Ministry who improperly receive benefits whilst living in either a marriage or 
in a relationship in the nature of marriage. Here the debt is beyond dispute, 
however the question which needs to be addressed is whether the impact of 
extreme domestic violence can have any impact on the Chief Executive ' s 
determination as to whether or not to recover the debt under s 86(1) of the Act. In 
assessing this question emphasis will be placed on the status of the relationship 
and how this effects recovery considerations. This inquiry will involve an 
examination of the extent to which the Social Security Act (a combination of s 
63(a) and (b) and s 86(1)) differentiates between battered debtors involved in de 
facto relationships and battered debtors who are married. 
132 
( 12 September 2000) NZPD 545 I. 
133 Chief Execurive of rhe Department of Work and /11co111e v Vicary, High Court, Wellington , AP 
158/00 (11 April 2001). 
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The analysis here will proceed on two fronts. First, an 
extensive argument 
will be made that the discretion bestowed on the Chief
 Executive under s 63(a) to 
regard as unmarried any married person for the purp
oses of benefit entitlement 
can and should be invoked if the hypothetical scenario
 were in fact to arise. This 
argument will be based on an assessment of the livin
g apart criterion in s 63(a) 
(see below). If this position is accepted, then as of consequen
ce there is no debt as 
the married person would be entitled to the benefit. Suc
h a result would bring into 
line marriage and de facto relationships in cases of extr
eme violence. 
If this argument is not accepted, then an alternative argume
nt is that the 
Chief Executive could decide under s 86(1) to not 
recover the debt. Such a 
decision would be the consequence of an appropria
te balancing of all of the 
relevant considerations canvassed above. The specia
l nature of this particular 
scenario would also call for some additional factors 
to be taken into account. 
These factors will be dealt with below. The prima
ry concern for the Chief 
Executive here would be the realisation that a person
 in a de facto relationship 
who had suffered the same facts would, on the basis 
of Ruka, be entitled to the 
benefit and therefore incur no debt. It will be argued th
at the recovery of the debt 
of a married person in this position would amount to
 possible discrimination at 
law and therefore the Chief Executive would be entitled
 to not recover the debt. 
In order to assess the impact that domestic violence ha
s on the discretion, 
certain threshold questions need first to be addressed. T
hese questions concern the 
nature and status of the relationship and also the requisi
te level of violence needed 
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before it can be considered a factor in the decision-making process. The threshold 
questions entai I a variety of difficult issues. Therefore, they need to be examined 
in some detail. However, it is important to bear in mind that the following 
discussion should be read as an inquiry seeking to justify the decision to recover 
or not recover an established debt. 
VIII THE FIRST ARGUMENT: EXERCISING THE DISCRETION 
UNDER s 63(a) 
The argument advanced here is that in the specific scenario posed, the 
Chief Executive should consider such a person as unmarried and therefore eligible 
for the benefit under s 63(a). The result of this argument is that the prima facie 
fraud committed on the Ministry would not result in a debt due to the Crown 
under s 85. Section 63 of the Act provides: 
For the purposes of determining any application for any benefit, or reviewing any benefit 
already granted ... the chief executive may in the chief executive's discretion -
(a) Regard as an unmarried person any married applicant or beneficiary who is living apart 
from his wife or her husband, as the case may be: 
(b) Regard as husband and wife any man and woman who, not being legally married, have 
entered into a relationship in the nature of marriage -
and may determine a date on which they shall be regarded as having commenced to live apart 
or a date on which they shall be regarded as having entered into such a relationship, as the 
case may be, and may then in the chief executive's discretion grant a benefit, refuse to grant a 
benefit, or terminate, reduce, or increase any benefit already granted, from that date 
accordingly. 
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As subsections (a) and (b) of s 63 require different considerations, they will be 
dealt with separately, beginning with relationships in the nature of marriage under 
subsection (b). 
A Section 63(b) 
The leading case concerning relationships in the nature of marriage is 
Ruka v Department of Social Welfare, 134 which amended the approaches hitherto 
taken on the basis of Excell v Department of Social Welfare, 
135 
and Thompson v 
Department of Social Welfare. 136 Miss Ruka suffered extreme violence at the 
hands of her partner, with whom she had shared a relationship spanning 18 years. 
The Court of Appeal accepted that Ruka suffered from battered woman's 
syndrome. 137 The High Court had convicted Ruka of benefit fraud on the charge 
that she had improperly received a domestic purposes benefit while living in a 
relationship in the nature of marriage, making her ineligible to receive the benefit. 
The Court of Appeal overturned the High Court's decision and quashed Ruka' s 
convictions. 138 
Barker J tn the High Court employed the orthodox approach from 
Thomson, which listed a set of indicia that were relevant to the existence of a 
relationship in the nature of marriage. Factors include shared housing, sexual 
relations, emotional support, socialising, children, the sharing of domestic tasks, 
134 R11ka v Department of Social Welfare [ 1997] I NZLR 154 (CA). 
135 Excell v Department of Social Welfare [ 1991] NZFLR 241 (HC). 
136 Thompson v Department of Social Welfare [ 1994) 2 NZLR 369 (HC). 
m Ruka, above n 134, 164, Henry and Gault JJ. 
138 See Bill Atkin "Challenging Conventional Understandings" in Andrew Bainham (ed) The 
!11temario11al S11rvey of Family Law 1996 (Martinus ijhoff, London, 1996) 290. 
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household expenses, and whether the parties appear to outsiders as a couple. 139 
The majority approach of the Court of Appeal in Ruka altered the orthodox 
approach by stating that such a relationship is: 140 
an acceptance by one partner that (to take the stereotypical role) he will support the other 
partner and any child or children of the relationship if she has no income of her own or to 
the extent that it is or becomes inadequate. The commitment must go beyond mere 
sharing of living expenses, as platonic flatmates or siblings living together may do; it 
must amount lo a willingness to support, if need exists. There must be at least that degree 
of financial engagement or understanding between the couple. 
As Wiseman points out, m the majority's reasoning, emotional 
commitment must supplement financial interdependence: 141 
Where financial support is available nevertheless there will not be a relationship in the 
nature of marriage for this purpose unless that support is accompanied by sufficient 
features evidencing a continuing emotional commitment not arising from just a blood 
relationship. 
This new two-pronged test absolved Ruka of benefit fraud in that the absence of 
financial support from her partner, coupled with the lack of emotional support 
"meant that [she l had not been living in a relationship in the nature of 
marriage". 142 Therefore, under s 63(b), there was no basis for the Chief Executive 
to consider Ruka ineligible for the benefit and as such there was no debt to collect. 
139 Ruka, above n 134. 159, Richardson P and Blanchard J. 
140 Ruka, above n 134, 161, Richardson P and Blanchard J. 
141 Jessica Wise man " Determining a Relationship in the Nature of Marriage: The Impact of Ruka 
on the Department of Work and Income's Conjugal Status Policy" (2001) 48 VU WLR 978. 
142 Wiseman, above n 141 , 979. 
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A notable aspect of the decision is the weight given to the existence of 
violence in the relationship. As Hughes points out, "the presence of extreme 
violence over the relevant period ... could affect the question whether the parties 
were living in a relationship in the nature of marriage".
143 
This is a broad assertion, 
which needs qualification, as the Court was essentially divided on the issue. 
Blanchard and Richardson JJ for the majority believed that violence, or rather the 
existence of battered woman's syndrome
144 is "a factor available to be taken into 
account in the determination of whether a relationship in the nature of marriage 
existed". 145 Thomas J, concurring in the main with the majority, placed substantial 
emphasis on the violent nature of Ruka' s relationship, and the implications of the 
syndrome. For Thomas J, and presumably Blanchard and Richardson JJ, the 
violence "negated the basic mental and emotional commitment which is essential 
to a relationship in the nature of marriage" .
146 
We can view this, then, as a subset of the second limb of the test given 
above: if in evidence the extent of the violence is deemed to be so bad that it 
negatives the requisite emotional commitment, it must follow that a relationship in 
the nature of marriage cannot be established. This argument is inconsistent with 
the view given by Atkin that: 
147 
if an association was violent at its inception, then that might tell against the 
commencement of a marriage-like relationship, but if violence surfaces later in the 
143 John Hughes "Lone Parents and Social Security" (2005) 36 VUWLR 13. 
144 Battered woman's syndrome as a legal concept will be discussed below. 
145 Ruka v Departmenr of Social Welfare [ 1997) l ZLR 154, I 63, Richardson P and Blanchard J. 
146 Ruka, above n 145 , 179, Thomas J. 
147 Atkin, above n 138, 29 I. 
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association it is hard to see how it can negate an already existing marriage-like 
relationship. 
On the majority's test it should not matter at what stage the violence occurs, as it 
can only have the one effect of negating the emotional commitment. 
The findings of Ruka arguably set a precedent for exculpating people in de 
facto relationships who commit some type of fraud on the Ministry in order to 
receive a benefit. Exculpation comes in the form of removing from the equation 
the prima facie fraudulent behaviour in acknowledging the true circumstances of 
the situation - that is, in acknowledging that there does not a relationship in the 
nature of marriage in existence. The implication of this is that the Chief Executive 
has no grounds for recovering the debt, because the debt no longer exists . The 
question here is can this same logic be applied to marriage situations. (It is worth 
stressing again here that even if the logic cannot be applied to marriages then the 
Chief Executive would still be left with a discretion under s 86(1) as to whether or 
not to collect the debt. This point will be explored in detail below). 
Blanchard and Richardson JJ acknowledge the connection with legal 
. · h · 148 mamage m t e reasoning process: 
The expression ' re lationship in the nature of marriage ' necessarily requires a comparison 
with a legal marriage but that is not a straightforward exerc ise. A simple balancing of 
equivalent features is not poss ible because for married persons financial obligations are 
not voluntary: the dependent spouse has some right to maintenance. Furthermore, it is not 
1
~8 Hughes, above n 143, 13. 
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to be thought that because certain negative features (e.g. physical abuse, lack of 
emotional commitment) are found in some de jure marriages, the same factors in a 
relationship between a man and a woman who are not married are to be disregarded in 
determining whether that relationship is in the nature of a marriage. The comparison must 
seek to identify whether there exist in the relationship of two unmarried persons those key 
positive features which are to be found in most legal marriages which have not broken 
down (co-habitation and a degree of companionship demonstrating an emotional 
commitment). Where these are found together with financial interdependence there will 
be such a merging of lives as equates for the purposes of the legislation to a legal 
marriage. 
Although this passage concerns de facto relationships, by implication it 
sets some crucial requirements that are arguably needed for a legal marriage (a 
right to maintenance, cohabitation and a degree of companionship demonstrating 
an emotional commitment). Atkin has argued that the reasoning of the Ruka 
decision creates an artificial distinction between de facto relationships and legal 
marriages: 149 
[While] married spouses share mutual maintenance liabilities, financial interdependence 
is not necessary for a valid marriage. A marriage where there is no such interdependence 
may still be a valid marriage, and the couple may still 'live together'. In determining 
whether a married couple lives apart, a lack of financial support may be relevant but it is 
by no means decisive. 
To investigate this distinction, it is necessary to move on to an analysis of the 
situation under s 63(a). 
149 Bill Atkin "Challenging conventional understandings" in Andrew Bainham (ed) The 
llltemational Survey of Family Law 1996 (Martin us Nijhoff, London, I 996) 291. 
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B Section 63(a) 
Subsection (a) gives discretion to the Chief Executive to regard a legally 
married person as unmarried for the purposes of granting or reviewing a benefit, 
on the condition that this person is living apart from his or her spouse. 150 In 
Sullivan v Sullivan, 151 traditionally viewed as the leading case in the area, the 
Court of Appeal held that living apart involved " two essential ingredients - a 
physical separation and a mental attitude averse to cohabitation on the part of one 
or both of the spouses". 152 The important thing in this statement is the unflinching 
view of physical separation. Turner J believed that "cohabitation and ' living apart ' 
are mutually exclusive opposites" and that if "spouses are cohabiting, they are not 
living apart - and if they are living apart, they are not cohabiting. There can 
b "bi . d" " 153 moreover e no posst e mterrne iate stage . 
Regarding the physical element of living apart, Henry J in Sullivan had a 
slightly less rigid view of what was required. His Honour believed that "neither 
presence in, nor absence from, a particular house determines whether or not 
spouses are living apart. Physical separation and physical presence are each 
factors to be weighed in conjunction with other relevant facts". 154 The mental 
150 See The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington 2004) Dissolution of Marri age para 
19-21. 
15 1 Sullivan v Sullivan [ 1958) NZLR 91 2, 924 (CA). 
152 Sullivan , above n 15 1, 924, Turner J . 
153 Sullivan , above n 151 , 924, Turner J. 
154 Sullivan , above n 15 1, 934, Henry J. 
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element, an attitude averse to cohabitation by at least one spouse, is needed 
because "mere physical separation" is not enough on its own.
155 
As the authors of the Laws of New Zealand point out, the corollary of mere 
separation not being enough is not that there has to be a "conscious formulation of 
an intention finally to end the marriage". 156 The correct test is an objective one. 
The Family Court in Williams v Williams 157 championed an approach that took the 
Sullivan criteria as a baseline understanding, but supplemented this traditional 
approach with the "depth of insight that has since been acquired through the 
Family Court's collegiate approach to matrimonial problems". 
158 
The case 
involved the question whether an application for dissolution of a marriage could 
be ordered where the parties to the marriage were still cohabiting, or living under 
the same roof. In believing that it was possible, Judge Inglis decided the case by 
reasoning thus: 159 
But to a reasonable outside observer, fully informed of the true situation between the 
parties, in a position to observe the state of affairs as it existed ... it would have been 
perfectly obvious that the marriage was doomed and the parties were then irreconcilable. 
The reasonable outside observer would have been left in no doubt that the marriage was 
no more than a shell ... The reasonable outside observer would have concluded that any 
failure on the part of either spouse expressly to acknowledge the true state of affairs was 
simply a failure to recogni se reality, and of no significance in determining whether or not 
the parties had indeed crossed the threshold into a state of living apart. 
155 Sullivan, above n 15 1, 924, Turner J. 
156 The Laws of New Zealand ( Butterworths, Wellington 2004) Dissolution of Marriage para 21. 
157 Williams v Williams [ 1988] 4 ZFLR 769 (FC). 
158 Williams, above n 157,780, Jud ge Inglis . 
159 Williams , above n 157 , 781, Judge Ingli s. 
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Therefore, Williams makes it clear that the fact of living together (physical 
cohabitation) is not fatal to a claim that the parties to a marriage are in fact living 
apart. In another Family Court decision, McBride v McBride, 160 Judge Callaghan 
noted several points of law that were encountered in argument. Among them are 
the following: 161 
In considering whether or not the parties are living apart each case requires a careful 
consideration on its own facts . Physical separation and physical presence are to be 
weighed in conjunction with all other relevant facts 
Any other indicia need not on their own be decisive and normally it is a matter of 
assessing the whole situation affecting the parties to decide whether a state of living apart 
exists 
The content of the relationship needs to be examined where parti es have remained living 
under the same roof and the Court must be conscious not to proceed on the basis of what 
the relationship ought to have included. 
The above "Family Law" approaches to living apart can be contrasted with 
the approach taken in the High Court by McGechan J in Director-General of 
Social Welfare v W. 162 In that case the wife was living abroad while the husband, 
who had suffered from a stroke, remained in New Zealand. The reason for the 
wife's absence was that she was endeavouring to obtain US citizenship. It was 
found that there was no intermingling of finances between the couple. The case 
arose in response to the husband's stroke, and the subsequent denial of a sickness 
benefit. As the husband was unsure of his wife's earnings in the US, and as he 
160 McBride v McBride [ I 999] NZFLR 651 (FC). 
161 McBride , above n 160, 655-656, Judge Callaghan. 
162 Director-General of Social Welfare v W [ 1997) 2 NZLR 104 (HC). 
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"did not consider the marriage was ended", the "Social Welfare Department 
declined to regard him as 'single' under s 63(b)".
163 
McGechan J held that, in 
spite of the physical separation, the parties could not be considered as "living 
apart". The primary reason for this was the husband's evidence that he considered 
the marriage to still be extant. 
At this stage it is sufficient to draw a basic conclusion. The Family Court 
has to a large extent reinterpreted the Sullivan baseline understanding in terms of 
living apart. Both Williams and McBride make it clear that physical cohabitation 
can, in particular circumstances, be consistent with living apart. In W the High 
Court reasoned that even in the event of physical separation, it was possible to 
consider parties to a marriage as not living apart because there was evidence that 
at least one party considered the marriage not to be at an end. The inference that 
can be drawn from this is that physical separation is merely an element, and not a 
pre-requisite, to the determination of whether a married couple are "living apart". 
If this argument is accepted, we can begin to develop some consistency 
between the debt situations of married and unmarried people. Where relationships 
are found to include elements of extreme violence and abuse it is unlikely that an 
unmarried woman would be regarded by the Chief Executive as being in a 
relationship in the nature of marriage under s 63(b). This is because of the second 
element of the Ruka test, which posits that, even if the relationship does involve 
financial interdependence, the violence, if bad enough, can negative the requisite 
emotional commitment. Correspondingly, if the same bad fact situation is 
163 Director-General of Social Welfare v W, above n 162, l 05, McGechan J. 
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transplanted into a marriage, on the above interpretation of living apart, the 
recipient of the abuse could potentially be regarded as unmarried by the Chief 
Executive under s 63(a) by a combination of a mental attitude averse to 
cohabitation and an objective assessment of all the facts of the marriage (an 
evaluation of the level of violence required will follow below). This is a desirable 
result, as it avoids an anomaly between the categorisation of relationships. 
Otherwise, in virtually the same need situation, the married battered woman 
would incur a debt for all she had received whilst the unmarried battered woman 
would be deemed entitled to state assistance. 
Hughes has made an analogous argument in relation to entitlement to the 
domestic purposes benefit: 164 
... the existing categories of entitlement to the DPB represent essentially arbitrary 
divisions, based upon historical factors at the time of its introduction. The existence of a 
separate set of principles to be used when establishing eligibility for married and 
unmarried women respectively is one example. There seems to be no reason in principle 
why the same test - that developed by the Court of Appeal in Ruka - should not be 
applied to both situations. 
The decision of Paterson J in Creeks v R165 also provides support for the 
above argument. The case involved an appeal against conviction and sentence on 
charges of benefit fraud, namely, that the appellant had "dishonestly represented 
that she [and her husband] had ceased to live together as a married couple."166 
Counsel for both parties submitted arguments concerning the appropriate test for 
164 John Hughes "Lone Parents and Social Security" (2005) 36 YUWLR 22. 
165 Creeks v R, Court of Appeal, CA26/04 (23 June 2004). 
166 Creeks v R, above n 165, para 6, Patterson J. 
"living apart". It was found that it was immaterial what test was applied as on 
either scenario the appellant and her husband would have not met the necessary 
requirements. In spite of this, His Honour acknowledged, obiter, that "there may 
be arguments for having the one test to apply to both subsections (a) and (b) of s 
63, particularly in view of the recent changes in the Property (Relationships) Act 
1976". 167 This statement is a clear acknowledgement of the Court's willingness to 
recognise anomalies in the law, particularly with reference to developments in 
social thinking as reflected in related statutes. 
C Figuring the violence - what is needed? 
The argument outlined thus far has sought to streamline the s 63(a) and (b) 
scenarios by reference to the impact of violence in the relationship. The 
streamlining focuses exclusively on violence and not financial interdependence 
because, as noted above, a marriage may still be valid even if there is no financial 
interdependence, so long as the parties live together. Therefore, the only way to 
fracture the legal edifice of 'living together' in respect of a marriage is by 
reference to the violence creating in the mind of the battered person a mental 
attitude averse to cohabitation. Naturally, the accompanying objective assessment 
of all the facts of the relationship would look to the question of financial 
interdependence, but given the conclusion drawn that a marriage can exist without 
such interdependence it is prudent given the scope of this paper to focus on 
violence alone. 
167 Creeks v R, above n 165, para 14, Patterson J. 
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It is therefore necessary to determine what level of violence is needed 
before the arguments will be accepted. In relation to s 63(b), it was posited that 
the violence negated the requisite emotional commitment required for a 
relationship in the nature of marriage. In relation to s 63(a), it was argued that the 
violence would count for the mental attitude averse to cohabitation, and that this, 
taken together with the approach of the Family Court, could render the situation as 
one of living apart. 
The Law Commission report Battered Defendants: Victims of Domestic 
Violence Who Offend: A Discussion Paper168 canvassed the history of the concept 
of Battered Woman ' s Syndrome ("BWS"), and explained how the condition is 
used in evidence. The syndrome was borne out of two theories that sought to 
explain the behaviour of battered women, the 'cycle of violence ', and ' learned 
helplessness' . 169 Within the scientific community, there has been much debate 
concerning whether it is correct to view BWS as a diagnosable condition. The 
Commission sought to avoid the merits of that debate and instead focus its 
attention on "ensuring that evidence about the realities of battering relationships is 
presented in a way most likely to assist fact-finders". 170 
The Commission proposed to maintain the current admissibility of expert 
evidence on domestic violence covering the "broad range of issues concerning the 
168 New Zealand Law Commi ss ion Battered Defendants: Victims of Domestic Violence Who 
Offend: A Discussion Paper (NZLC R41, Wellington, 2000) . 
169 New Zealand Law Commi ss ion Battered Defendants: Victims of Domestic Violence Wh o 
0{!,end: A Discussion Paper, above n 168, 4. 
17 New Zealand Law Commission Battered Defendants: Victims of Domestic Violence Who 
Offend: A Discussion Paper, above n 168, 8. 
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psychological, social and economic aspects of domestic violence".
171 
Significantly 
for our purposes here, the Commission noted that expert evidence is "relevant and 
substantially helpful" 172 where it concerned the following:
173 
Research on the patterns of violence in battering relationships, the social and economic 
factors that affect battered women, the psychological effects of battering and separation 
violence. This may help to explain why the woman remained in the relationship. 
Elisabeth McDonald, in her article Battered Woman Syndrome,
174 
argued 
that knowing why the woman remained in the relationship is the principal utility 
of BWS being used in evidence. McDonald points out that the main arguments in 
favour of admitting the evidence "is that it will assist the jury understanding why 
the woman behaved the way she did"
175 because: 1
76 
Many people do not understand why a woman does not leave an abusive relationship, and 
jurors may therefore attempt to explain this by categorising her as either a masochist, who 
enjoys being beaten, or a liar who has exaggerated the extent of the abuse. 
As John Hughes points out, 177 due to the fact that financial 
interdependence and emotional commitment "were absent in Ruka, the majority 
did not rely on the effect of battered woman's syndrome in formulating the 
171 ew Zealand Law Commission Battered Defendants: Victims of Domestic Violence Who 
Offend: A Discussion Paper, above n 168, 9. 
172 ew Zealand Law Commission Battered Defendams: Victims of Domestic Violence Who 
Offend: A Discussion Paper, above n 168, 9. 
173 ew Zealand Law Commission Battered Defendants: Victims of Domestic Violence Who 
Offend: A Discussion Paper, above n 168, 9. 
174 Elisabeth McDonald "Battered Woman Syndrome" (1997) NZU 436. 
175 McDonald, above n 174, 436. 
176 McDonald, above n 174,436. 
177 John Hughes "Battered Woman' s Syndrome and Interdependence as Factors in Establishing 
Conjugal Status in Social Security Law" ( 1999) 7 Waikato LR. 
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reasons for their decision", 178 other than to say it is a factor that goes to "the 
determination of whether a relationship in the nature of marriage existed". 179 This, 
therefore, is unhelpful in determining what level of violence must exist in a 
relationship before it can be considered to either negate the requisite emotional 
commitment in s 63(b), or be used as a factor in the living apart inquiry under s 
63(a). 
It is argued that the approach taken by Thomas J in Ruka is the most 
suitable benchmark for determining the level of violence and its impact on the two 
inquiries under s 63: 180 
But while the syndrome represents an acute form of the battering relationship ... it is 
probably preferable ... to avoid reference to it and simply to speak of the battering 
relationship. There is a danger that in being too closely defined, the syndrome will 
become too rigidly approached by the Courts ... [The] syndrome, where it is found lo 
exist, is not in itself a justification for the commission of a crime. It is the effects of the 
violence on the battered woman's mind and will, as those effects bear on the particular 
case, which is pertinent. It is not, therefore, simply a matter of ascertaining whether a 
woman is suffering from battered woman's syndrome and, if so, treating that as an 
exculpatory factor. What is important is that the evidence established that the battered 
woman is suffering from symptoms or characteristics which are relevant to the particular 
case. In determining whether a battered woman is living in a relationship in the nature of 
marriage, therefore, the ultimate question is whether the evidence establishes that she 
possesses those symptoms or characteristics which negative or tend lo negative any 
element which would otherwise point to the relationship being one in the nature of 
marriage. 
178 Hughes, above n 177, 124. 
179 
Ruka v Department of Social Welfare [ I 997] I ZLR 154, 162-163, Richardson P and 
Blanchard J. 
180 R11ka,aboven 179, 173- 174, ThomasJ.SeeHughes,aboven 177, 125. 
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Although this passage refers only to s 63(b), it can be used in the s 63(a) inquiry 
as well. The nub of the passage is His Honour's statement that what "is important 
is that the evidence established that the battered woman is suffering from 
symptoms or characteristics which are relevant to the particular case".
181 
In the s 
63(a) inquiry, the violence will be relevant to the extent that it creates in the mind 
of the battered person a mental attitude averse to cohabitation. This is an objective 
assessment, which will take into consideration the "Family Court" factors as 
outlined above. 
A relatively recent decision of the Social Security Appeal Authority 
provides a good illustration of the type of scenario the fact-finder can be 
confronted with. In SSAA Decision No 062/03, 
182 the Authority considered 
whether the appellant was living apart from her husband. Hughes highlights the 
following point from the Authority's reasoning:
183 
. . . the appellant was held not to have been "living apart" from her husband, 
notwithstanding that she had feared for her physical safety during intermittent periods 
when they shared a household (amongst other things he had chased her with an axe, 
punched her, and assaulted the ir school age daughter). 
This finding demonstrates the difficulty of arriving at an appropriate level 
of violence in order to satisfy the test for living apart. It is argued that this 
difficulty should not be considered insurmountable, and that it is a necessary task 
181 Ruka, above n 179, 174, Thomas J. 
182 SSAA Decision No 062/03 (21 May 2003) SSA 243/02. 
183 John Hughes "Lone Parents and Soc ial Security" (2005) 36 VUWLR 20. 
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if we are to avoid the unjust anomaly that occurs in the interplay of s 63(a) and (b). 
At the very least it is argued that where particularly bad violence is established 
and the general situation is consistent with the facts in Ruka, the Chief Executive 
may treat a married person as living apart from their spouse and therefore satisfy 
the s 63(a) criteria. Every case will be different, but the essential point that must 
be established is that the violence created, objectively, a mental attitude averse to 
cohabitation. To reiterate Judge Callaghan's approach in McBride, it "is a matter 
of assessing the whole situation affecting the parties to decide whether a state of 
living apart exists". 184 
The implication of this argument is that it tacitly upholds the Appeal 
Authority's decision in SSAA Decision No 73/99
185 "that the woman be a 'virtual 
prisoner' of the man" before it would stretch the living apart criteria to include 
situations where the husband and wife still live under the same roof.
186 As this 
paper is only concerned with this specific situation - transplanting the Ruka facts 
to a marriage situation, and asking how this effects the discretion whether or not 
to recover the debt - no judgement is made as to how lower levels of violence 
would affect the discretion. 187 
IX THE ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT 
184 McBride v McBride [1999) NZFLR 651,656, Judge Callaghan. 
185 SSAA Decision No 73/99 (30 July 1999) SSA 6/99. See Hughes, above n 184, 19. 
186 Hughes, above n 183, 18-19. 
187 See Hughes, above n 183, 20 where it is pointed out that in the Appeal Authority the Chief 
Executive has argued that " violence is s imply not a relevant factor in assessing whether a married 
couple are living apart". The argument of thi s paper is that where the violence and the general 
situation equates with that seen in Ruka then the violence is substantially material. 
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If the interpretation of s 63(a) is not accepted, and therefore a debt is 
established on the Ministry ' s books, it is argued that the Chief Executive has the 
ability to decide not to recover the debt under s 86(1). This decision would have to 
be premised on an appropriate balancing of the relevant considerations, taking 
into account such factors as the aims and purposes of social security and also the 
restrictive public finance obligations that are incumbent on the Chief Executive. 
This situation gives rise to some additional factors that should be taken into 
account in the exercise of the discretion. Primarily, the concern here is that the 
Chief Executive does not want to make a decision that would result in 
discriminatory treatment. It is submitted that the disparity between married and 
unmarried persons in this circumstance is potentially discriminatory. In light of 
this, it is necessary to carefully identify the additional factors and the reasons why 
they are important. 
A Discrimination on the basis of marital status 
As illustrated above, an orthodox reading of s 63 will result in an 
unmarried battered woman being entitled to a benefit, whereas a married woman 
in exactly the same kind of abusive relationship would not be entitled to the same 
benefit. The question here is whether this would amount to discrimination under 
the law. 
Section 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 states: "Everyone 
has the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of discrimination in 
the Human Rights Act 1993". Section 21 of the Human Rights Act 1993 lists the 
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prohibited grounds of discrimination. Relevant here is s 2l(l)(b) which states that 
a prohibited ground of discrimination is "marital status, which means being ... 
married, in a civil union, or in a de facto relationship". 188 
In Quilter v Attorney-General, 189 Gault J believed that: 190 
It [ was] necessary to distinguish between permissible differentiation and impermissible 
differentiation amounting to discrimination ... Discrimination generally is understood to 
involve differentiation by reference to a particular characteristic (classification) which 
characteristic does not justify the difference. Justification for differences frequently will 
be found in social policy resting on community values . 
In this dissenting judgement in the same case, Thomas J premised his discussion 
of discrimination on the basis that the overall aim of the law should be to provide 
equality of treatment. For Thomas J, the fundamental question was: 191 
not whether there is a distinction but whether the distinction which exists is based on the 
personal characteristics of the individual or group and has the effect of imposing burdens, 
obligations, or di sadvantages on that individual or group which are not imposed on others. 
His Honour also believed that for the purpose of giving effective operation to the 
right contained in the Bill of Rights , it was incorrect to make a distinction 
between discrimination which arises from "a law which in its term discriminates 
188 Human Rights Act 1993, s 21(l)(b)(ii). 
189 Quilter v Attorney-General [ 1998] I NZLR 523 (CA). 
190 Quilter, above n 189,527. Gault J. 
191 Quilter, above n I 89, 532, Thomas J dissenting. 
55 
against an individual or group and a law which has a disproportionately severe 
impact on an individual or group".
192 
On the basis of these statements, it is clear that the anomaly between s 
63(a) and (b) can be viewed as discrimination on the basis of marital status, as per 
s 2l(l)(b)(ii) of the Human Rights Act, and thus s 19 of the Bill of Rights Act. In 
reference to the statement of Gault J above, that the justification for different 
treatment in the law can be sourced in social policy and community mores, the 
author strongly argues that there is no tenable social policy or community 
standard (which, as a standard, is tenuous at best) that would justify the distinction 
at hand. 
B Impact on the discretion 
The situation could be seen as coming under the estoppel provision of s 
86(9A). This would require that the departmental officer had made an error in 
judging the married battered debtor as being ineligible to receive the benefit, 
whereas, so the argument goes, that person was entitled to the benefit under the 
revised interpretation of s 63(a) as outlined above. The problem here is that, if we 
were to transplant the Ruka facts into a marriage situation, then it cannot be said 
that the sum was received in good faith , as per s 86(9A)(a)(i). 
192 Quilter, above n 189, 533, Thomas J dissenting. 
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It is more likely that the situation would simply fall under the general 
discretion under s 86(1 ). It is the premise of this paper that the Chief Executive's 
discretion under s 86(1) is not unfettered, a position upheld in the Attrill decision. 
It has been pointed out that in the McConkey decision 193 Goddard J 
reasoned that, due to the discretionary nature of s 86(1), factors such as 
" insolvency or uneconomic commercial return" 194 have the potential to tip the 
scales in favour of not recovering an established debt. It is submitted here that the 
very real potential for discrimination could be included as one of Goddard J's 
factors. However, before this position is reached the Chief Executive needs to 
properly address all the relevant considerations. The basic point is that the 
decision cannot be made out of simple compassion; it needs to be made in a 
manner which is mindful of all the obligations and responsibilities incumbent on 
the Chief Executive. 
In this particular scenario, there are two additional factors that the Chief 
Executive should take into account. The first, the prospect of an adverse finding 
by the Ombudsman, has already been considered to some extent, however the 
Ombudsman has powers that are particularly relevant here, and so therefore 
further discussion is required. The second consideration is the prospect of an 
adverse finding by the Human Rights Review Tribunal. It has already been 
established that the situation could give rise to a case of prima facie 
discrimination under the Bill of Rights, and as such there is real potential for a 
successful Bill of Rights challenge in the courts. However, it is worth noting the 
193 McConkey v Director-Genera/ of Work and Income New Zealand, High Court, Wellington, 
AP277/00 ( 14 August 2002). 
19
~ McConkey, above n 193, 9, Goddard J. 
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scope and nature of the Human Rights Review Tribunal here as it is a more likely 
avenue of complaint, given that there are no costs involved in bringing a 
complaint. 
1 Ombudsman 
Under s 22 (l)(b) of the Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction 
to report that any decision (for example, a decision of the Chief Executive to 
recover a debt) was "unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or improperly 
discriminatory, or was in accordance with a rule of law or a provision of any 
act . . . that is or may be unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or improperly 
discriminatory" .195 
Translating this power to the situation at hand, the Ombudsman would 
have jurisdiction to assess a decision to recover a debt from a married battered 
debtor in light of its justness and potential oppressiveness. The Ombudsman may 
also consider whether the decision is improperly discriminatory on the basis that 
the same debt would not be recovered from an unmarried battered debtor. 
Such an inquiry would be sure to hit the snag of the s 63(a) and (b) 
anomaly. While s 22(1)(b) enables the Ombudsman to report that the rule of law 
upon which the decision was made contains certain deficiencies, s 22(3)(e) of the 
Ombudsman Act, allows for jurisdiction to recommend that any law on which a 
"decision, recommendation, act, or omission [is] based should be 
195 Ombudsman Act 1975, s 22( l)(b). 
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reconsidered". 196 Given this potential, a decision by the Chief Executive not to 
recover the debt of a married battered debtor would find sufficient justification in 
law, and would therefore be administratively sound. 
2 Human Rights Review Tribunal 
Section 76 of the Human Rights Act outlines the Human Rights 
Commission's responsibility for receiving and assessing complaints that allege a 
breach of the Act. Section 92B states that where such a complaint has been made, 
"the complainant, the person aggrieved (if not the complainant), or the 
Commission may bring civil proceedings before the Human Rights Review 
Tribunal". 197 Section 92B(2) states that where such a complaint "relates to a 
discriminatory practice ... proceedings under subsection (1) may be brought by 
the Commission on behalf of the class of persons affected". 
198 
Section 921 provides for remedies. The relevant parts of the section read as 
follows: 
(3) Jf ... the Tribunal is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant has 
committed a breach ... the Tribunal may grant I or more of the following remedies: 
(a) a declaration that the defendant has committed a breach ... 
(b) an order restraining the defendant from continuing or repeating the breach, or from 
engaging in, or causing or permitting others to engage in, conduct of the same kind as that 
constituting the breach, or conduct of any similar kind specified in the order 
(c) ... 
196 Ombudsman Act 1975, s 22(3)(e). 
197 Human Rights Act 1993, s 928( I). 
198 Human Rights Act 1993, s 92B(2). 
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(d) an order that the defendant perform any acts specified in the order with a view to 
redressing any loss or damage suffered by the complainant or, as the case may be, the 
aggrieved person as a result of the breach 
(e) . .. 
(f) an order that the defendant undertake any specified training or any other programme, 
or implement any specified policy or programme, in order to assist or enable the 
defendant to comply with the provisions of this Act 
It is evident that the Tribunal has powers, particularly in relation to 
granting remedies that can have far-reaching consequences for the defendant. It 
has been established that recovering the debt of a married battered debtor could 
constitute discrimination under the s 19 of the Bill of Rights Act, via s 21(1) of 
the Human Rights Act. It is notable that under the Tribunal's jurisdiction, a 
complaint of discrimination need only be satisfied to the standard of the balance 
of probabilities, as per s 92I(3). 
If this is made out the remedies available to the Tribunal could have 
significant consequences for the Ministry. Of particular importance would be the 
power to restrain the Ministry from continuing or repeating the breach, as per ss 
(3)(b), and the power to order the Ministry to implement any specified policy or 
programme to ensure that it does not breach the Human Rights Act, as per ss 
(3)(f). Such measures would render the orthodox approach to s 63 nugatory. It is 
therefore advanced that the potential for an adverse finding by the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal provides further support in administrative law for the Chief 
Executive's decision not to recover the debt of a battered married woman. 
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X RESOLUTION OF THE CASE STUDY 
The majority decision in Ruka established that by virtue of the 
circumstances of Ruka's relationship, she was exculpated from having committed 
a fraud on the Ministry in order to receive a benefit. As illustrated above, the 
exculpation was the result of an inquiry into the material circumstances of Ruka's 
relationship and a finding that she could there did not exist a relationship in the 
nature of marriage. On this basis, the Chief Executive could not recover the 
Ruka's debt because, on the basis of the Court's decision, the debt no longer 
existed. 
It has been argued that in fact situations replicating the Ruka scenario, but 
where the battered debtor is married as opposed to being in a de facto relationship, 
it would be incongruous for the Chief Executive to recover the debt. However, as 
has been stressed several times in this paper, the Chief Executive must find some 
legal justification for not recovering the debt. This justification can be obtained on 
two fronts. On the basis of the above legal analysis of s 63(a), the Chief Executive 
could legitimately find that the client should be regarded as unmarried for the 
purposes of the benefit. Therefore, no debt would exist. Such a finding would be 
premised on the constructive interpretation of 'living apart' as outlined above. 
The other alternative, if the interpretation of s 63(a) is not considered 
desirable, would be to decide not to recover the debt on the basis that the relevant 
considerations point to not recovering the debt. As has been pointed out, this debt 
scenario is distinct from the first two in that it involves weighing some additional 
factors. For the sake of clarity, the author will perform the balancing exercise here. 
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Of the main considerations, which equally apply to any debt recovery 
decision under s 86(1), the public finance dimension and the nature and purpose 
of the social security legislation are likely to be the most relevant. The respective 
concerns here are that the Chief Executive is mindful of the Ministry's financial 
accountability and that help should be given to those truly in need of financial 
assistance. In addition to these considerations, the Chief Executive should be 
aware of the very real prospect of a finding of discrimination on the basis of 
marital status either in the courts or in the Human Rights Review Tribunal. 
Furthermore, the role of the Ombudsman takes on considerable importance in 
relation to the ability to make findings on any unjust decision as well as the ability 
to recommend that any law that is giving rise to unjust results should be 
reconsidered. It is the author's contention that in this scenario there are sufficient 
factors which have the effect of trumping the public finance obligations. As such, 
an appropriate weighing of all of these considerations should point to a decision 
by the Chief Executive to not recover the debt. 
XI CONCLUSION 
The first conclusion of this paper is that s 86(1) and s 86(9A) provide for a 
discretion for the Chief Executive in the recovery of debts due to the Crown. As 
such, there are a number of obligations that are incumbent on the Chief Executive 
whenever this discretion is exercised. This paper has acknowledged that some of 
these obligations are conflicting. In light of this , it is argued that certain 
considerations should be taken into account whenever the discretion is exercised. 
The four general considerations apply to any decision to recover a debt under s 
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86(1). Those considerations are: The terms and guarantees of the Ministry's 
service charter; the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any 
administrative decision; the onerous public finance obligations the Chief 
Executive owes; and the nature and purpose of the Social Security legislation for 
which the Chief Executive has responsibility. 
It has been argued that the terms of the service charter have the ability to 
create for clients a legitimate expectation that they will be followed. As such, it is 
necessary for the chief Executive to bear the terms in mind whenever called upon 
to exercise the discretion. It has also been established that the Ombudsman's 
broad jurisdictional ambit means that the administrative decision to recover debt 
must be made in accordance with sound policy and on the basis of good practice. 
The public finance obligations on the Chief Executive are particularly 
onerous. Judge Michael Brown's report on CYFS
199 clearly illustrates that public 
finance considerations are likely to win out in conflicts with other statutory duties. 
However, it has been argued here that it is incorrect in administrative law to place 
undue weight on any one particular consideration when there are a range of 
considerations that need to be taken into account. In most cases, the fight for the 
centre ground will be between these public finance considerations and the aims 
and purposes of the Social security legislation. The point that has been stressed 
here is that if a proper process is followed, and each consideration is given due 
weight, then any decision to recover established debt under the Act will be sound 
in administrative law. 
199 Michael J A Brown Care and Protection is About Adult Behaviour: The Ministerial Review of 
the Departmem of Child, Yo111h and Family Services (Report to the Mini ster of Social Services and 
Employment, the Honourable Steve Mahary) December 2000. 
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This paper has also presented a case study as a means of fleshing out some 
of the issues that arise in decisions to recover particular debts. The hypothetical 
situation concerned a married person who had improperly received a benefit yet 
the marriage contained extreme domestic violence. This situation was chosen 
because of the uneasy comparison with people in the same factual position but 
living in a de facto relationship. On the basis of the majority's decision in Ruka v 
Department of Social Welfare, 200 the de facto person would be entitled to the 
benefit and therefore no debt would arise. This paper has attempted to reconcile 
the married and de facto positions for the purposes of debt recovery. 
The first argument was that the hypothetical married person would be 
entitled to the benefit on a constructive interpretation of s 63(a). This involved 
unpacking the legal edifice of the concept of living apart, which is a pre-requisite 
to the exercise of the Chief Executive's discretion under that provision. It was 
concluded that if the facts of the Ruka case were to be replicated in a marriage, 
then the Chief Executive had the ability to consider that person entitled to the 
benefit under s 63(a). As such, no debt would be registered against the person and 
therefore there would be no debt to recover under s 86(1). 
If this argument was not accepted, and the consequence was that a debt 
was lodged against the person in the Ministry's books, then the alternative 
argument was that the Chief Executive still had discretion to decide not to recover 
the debt under s 86(1). This decision would involve balancing the general 
200 Ruka ,, Department of Social Welfare [ 1997] l ZLR 154 (CA). See the discussion of s 63(b) 
of the Social Security Act I 964 above. 
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considerations outlined above, as well as taking into account the potential for 
discrimination at law. The discrimination would arise in relation to the difference 
of treatment between married persons and persons in de facto relationships . It was 
submitted that a decision not to recover the debt would be the only sensible 
outcome of an administratively proper balancing of all the considerations. 
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